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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE "ABORTED" EVOLUTION OF FE
TAL RIGHTS AFTER Roe

v. Wade-Doug/as v. Town
F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982).
I.

ofHariford,

542

INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 1 held
that" 'person' [within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment]
... does not include the unbom";2 almost a decade later, on July 2,
1982, T. Emmet Clarie, a Connecticut Federal District Court Judge,
in denying a motion to dismiss, held in Doug/as v. Town ofHariford 3
that a "viable fetus is a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983".4 Are these two decisions consistent or do they reflect a di
rect conflict? This note suggests that there is a direct conflict which
cannot be resolved simply by distinguishing a case based on the
fourteenth amendment from one based on section 1983; an examina
tion of the legal history and purpose of section 1983 makes this point
clear.s
Given that the cases are in direct conflict, is there some analysis
of Judge Clarie's decision that might provide a rationale for his ap
parent flouting of the Supreme Court's holding in Roe?6 In the
Doug/as opinion, the judge reasoned that since fetal protection had
been extended in a numb~r of recent cases,7 it should not be denied
in this one. 8 In this note his rationale is strengthened by an exami
nation of I) the evolution of fetal rights both before and after the
Roe decision9 and 2) the problems and potential conflicts created by
that decision. lO
This examination makes it clear that the Roe decision has inter
fered with the evolution of fetal rights and has made it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to provide protection to the potentially
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 158.
542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982).
Id. at 1269. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
542 F. Supp. at 1270.
Id.
See infra notes 17-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-110 and accompanying text.
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viable fetus. I I Lawmakers at both the federal and state levels have
responded with "solutions"12 that are untenable at this point in our
history when the concerns expressed by the Roe Court l3 are still
valid. This note examines those "solutions" and their conse
quences l4 and suggests that Judge Clarie's decision may offer a more
acceptable alternative. 15 This alternative solution would extend such
protection in a way that would allow both continued recognition of a
woman's constitutionally protected right to an abortion as well as a
balancing of that right against the fetus's equally protected right at
the point of potential viability.16
II.

A.

FETAL RIGHTS EVOLUTION

Tort Law 17

The beginning of common law tort actions involving injury to
the fetus can be traced back to 1884 when, in Dietrich v. Northamp
ton, IS} the cO\lrt held that there was no cause of action for prenatal
injuries. 19 As early as 1898, however, the dissenting opinion in Af
faire v. St. Luke's Hospita/ 20 argued that such an action should be
allowed -when the fetus is viable. 21 The first real turning point came
in 1946 when the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz 22 extended protection to a
viable fetus which was born alive;23 today such protection is avail
able in essentially all jurisdictions. 24 The viability distinction was
abandoned soon thereafter25 and today is not a requirement in most
11. ld.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 105-20.
13. 410 U.S. at 153.
14. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 129-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
17. The evolution of tort law in this area has been thoroughly traced both before
and after Roe in a number of law reviews. See, e.g. , Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal
Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639 (1980); King, The Juridical Status of the
Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unhorn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1979);
Murphy, The Evolution of The Prenatal Duty Rule: Analysis hy Inherent Determinants, 7
U. DAY. L. REV. 351 (1982).
18. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
19. Id. at 17.
20. 76 Ill. App. 441 (1898), affdper curiam, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
21. ld. at 454 (Windes, J., dissenting).
22. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
23. Id. at 141-42.
24. See Kader, supra note 17, at 642. For a list of cases that have followed Bon
brest, see M. Shaw & C. Damme, Legal Status of the Fetus, GENETICS AND THE LAW 14
n. 14 (A. Milunsky & G.J. Annas eds. 1976).
25. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline, 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
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jurisdictions. 26
Pre-Roe tort actions involving the interpretation of statutes
showed an evolutionary process similar to that in the common law
area. Three years after Bonbrest was decided, one state court de
clared that a viable fetus, born alive, was a "person" within its con
stitution. 27 A decade later, a court in the same state held that there
was a cause of action for wrongful death if a viable fetus was injured
and then stillbom. 28 It was in this case that the well-known twin
hypothetical originated. 29 The evolutionary process was continued
in 1967 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a
nonviable fetus who had been injured and then had lived two and
one-half hours after birth was a "person" within the state's wrongful
death act. 30
After the Roe decision, the opinions in the civil statutory law
area can generally be grouped in three main classes, with a number
of strong dissents in each. In the first group, the courts have essen
tially ignored the Roe holding and have continued to extend protec
tion to the fetus by allowing a wrongful death action whfther or not
the fetus was viable at the time ofinjury.31 In the secop.d, the fourts
have held that, if viable, a fetus is a "person" within the statute, al
lowing recovery without a live birth requirement. 32 Earlier, one
court in this group had interpreted the same statute to include the
nonviable fetus. 33 The courts in the third group have taken the Roe
decision even further and declared that a fetus, viable or not, is not a
26. See Kader, supra note 17, at 644.
27. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334,
340 (1949).
28. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 433, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
29. In the twin hypothetical, twin fetuses were injured shortly before birth; one
died before, and the other immediately after, birth. The court pointed out there was no
valid reason to allow recovery for one and not for the other. Id. at 108.
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1983-1984). Torigian v. Watertown
News Co., 352 Mass. 446,449,225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967).
31. E.g., Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972); Presley v. Newport
Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). For examples of cases that have allowed a
nonviable fetus to recover only if born alive, see, Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 421
A.2d 134 (1980); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981).
32. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974); Green v.
Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d
368,304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981); Mone v. Grey
hound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268
Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974). This appears to be the majority position at this time. Weitl
v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 277-78 (Iowa 1981) (Larson, J., dissenting).
33. Compare Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 355, 331 N.E.2d 916, 917
(1975) (statute includes only viable fetuses) with Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352
Mass. 446, 449, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967) (statute includes nonviable fetuses).
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"person,"34 echoing that argument in Roe. 35 This was also the posi
tion taken by a federal district court in Florida when an action was
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act36 for the stillborn death
of a viable fetus due to a hospital's malpractice. 37
Fetal rights in common law tort actions have continued to
evolve since Roe. Several recent cases have held that even a precon
ception tort which results in injury to the fetus generates a cause of
action. 38 Clearly, the evolution of fetal rights was advancing toward
greater protection before Roe, 39 contrary to an argument the Court
made in Roe,40 and has continued to do so since that decision,41 in
spite of the problems created by it. 42

B. Criminal Law
In the area of criminal law, there is less evidence of the evolu
tion of fetal rights before Roe, but at least one state has defined the
crime of murder to include the killing of a fetus. 43 After Roe, the
courts atten;tpted to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with
that decisiou .. In two cases, when a viable fetus was injured and then
lived a short time after birth, the crime of murder was charged. 44
When the fetus was not viable at the time of injury, however, courts
have found it necessary to dismiss the charge of either murder45 or
manslaughter,46 regardless of the atrocity of the crime.
Courts have been particularly troubled when the injury oc
34. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580, 565 P.2d 122, 132-33, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 107-08 (1977); Weitl v. Moes, 31\ N.W.2d 259, 273 (Iowa 1981).
35. 410 U.S. at 158.
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37. Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759, 760-61 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
38. Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade John
son Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Rens10w v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d
348,367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Albala v. New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108,429
N.E.2d 786 (1981).
39. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
40. 410 U.S. at 161-62.
41. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1983).
44. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103,402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Anderson, 135
N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 173 N.J.
Super. 75, 413 A.2d 61\ (1980).
45. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App.3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
46. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976); Larkin v.
Cahalan, 389 Mich. 533, 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973).
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curred at approximately the time the fetus became viable. 47 Some
courts have solved this problem by simply declaring that the relevant
statute does not apply to the unborn;48 others have declared it un
constitutionally vague. 49 With the Roe decision in the background,
criminal law, even in areas not involving abortion, cannot evolve
past a Bonbrest -type analysis. 50
C. Abortion Law and The Problems Created by The Roe Decision
In 1821 the first criminal abortion statute was adopted in Con
necticut, making it a crime to abort a fetus after quickening. 51 By
1860, Connecticut's statute had been revised to extend protection to
the fetus before quickening, 52 and by the late 1950's a large majority
of states had banned abortion except to save the life of the mother. 53
At the time Roe was heard, however, the evolutionary trend in the
abortion area was actually away from absolute fetal protection. 54
Perhaps recognjzjng a need to balance a woman's interest in the
birth process and the difficult problems some pregnancies presented
for both society and the mother, the states began to m'ove'toward
liberalization of the abortion laws in certain circumstances. 55 Yet
the need for greater protection for the unborn had not been forgotten
in other areas of the law. 56
47. The time is indefinite, usually occurring between twenty-four and twenty-eight
weeks, but may occur earlier as medical technology advances. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-61.
48. E.g., State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257
(R.I. 1982); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978).
49. E.g., People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978).
50. An analysis that distinguishes between a viable and nonviable fetus. See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-39 n.29. Quickening is a time when life is first felt by the
mother. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-39 n.30.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Fourteen states had adopted ALI's Model Penal Code § 230.3 which permitted
abortion if the child were going to be born mentally retarded or physically defective, if
the pregnancy were a result of rape or incest, or if the mother's life were in danger. Id. at
139-40 n.37. While Roe was pending, the court in Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D.
Conn. 1972), held that a recently passed statute only permitting abortion to save the
mother's life was unconstitutional and, further, that a fetus was not a "person" until
birth. Id. at 229. For an excellent discussion of this movement, see, Morgan, infra note
63, at 1726.
55. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40 n.37.
56. The New Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950
25954 (Deering 1982), legalized abortion in California during the first twenty weeks of
pregnancy if the mother's mental or physical health would be gravely impaired by carry
ing the child to term. In the criminal law forum, however, the California Supreme Court
held that a man who had maliciously killed a viable fetus could not be charged with
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The Court in Roe struck down a Texas criminal abortion statute
as unconstitutional based on a woman's fundamental right to pri
vacy or autonomy, a right which allowed her to choose to end her
pregnancy.57 The state was held to have an interest in protecting
maternal health and the potential life of the fetus, but neither inter
est was compelling throughout pregnancy.58 Supposedly, after Roe,
a balancing test would be applied after the first trimester, but during
that trimester no interference by the state would be permitted. 59 Af
ter the first trimester, the state's compelling interest in the mother's
health would be considered,60 but only' at the point when the fetus
had become viable would the state's compelling interest in protecting
it be weighed. 61 The Court held that" 'person' [within the four
teenth amendment] ... does not include the unborn."62 Criticisms
of the majority opinion in Roe have been strong,63 and some, includ
ing the dissent, have declared that the Court was engaged in legisla
tion. 64 Nevertheless, since Roe, the Court has tended, with the
exception of the funding cases,65 not only to follow, but also to ex
pand their holding. 66
In .Doe v. Bolton ,67 a companion case to Roe, a statute patterned
after the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, and similar to
that in one fourth of the states at the time of Roe, was substantially
murder, Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 639, 470 P.2d 617, 630, 87 Cal. Rptr.
481,494 (1970). In response, the legislature amended CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 to include
the killing of a fetus in the definition of murder. PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 47 n.a (5th ed. 1979).
57. 410 U.S. at 152-54.
58. Id at 164-65.
59. Id at 163.
60. Id at 164-65.
61. Id at 163-64.
62. Id at 158.
63. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Morgan, Roe v. Wade and'he Lesson of'he Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 1724 (1979).
64. E.g. ,Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ely, supra note 63, at 926;
Morgan, supra note 63, at 1730.
65. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438 (1977). In all of these cases the Court held that neither the Constitution nor
federal legislation required public funding for abortions. Zharaz, 448 u.s. a' 369; Mc
Rae, 448 U.S. at 311;Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521; Maher, 432 U.S. at 469; Beal, 432 U.S. at
443-48.
66. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. See also G. GUNTHER, infra
note 69, at 610.
67. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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invalidated. 68 Procedural restrictions, such as requiring a licensed
hospital and approval by an abortion committee, were struck down
as not rationally related to the patients needs. 69
The holding in Roe invalidated abortion statutes in a majority
of the states,70 and after Roe the difficulty in drafting any sort of
statute that would withstand constitutional attack became appar
ent.1 1 In Colautti v. Franklin, 72 the Court found the language of
Pennsylvania's criminal abortion statute vague, even though it was
patterned after the language of Roe;73 but, in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,74 the Court also struck down a statute which defined the
point at which the fetus would be protected in terms of the age of the
fetus. 75 Apparently, for such a statute to withstand constitutional at
tack, it must precisely define the point at which the fetus becomes
viable, a point that cannot be precisely defined, or it must base that
point and, therefore, the decision whether or not to abort, on the
physician's subjective determination. 76
The Supreme Court decisions since Roe clearly indicate that,
although the state may regulate abortion after viability, before that
point it may not provide the potentially viable fetus with any protec
68. Id. at 182 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n. 37).
69. Id. at 193-98. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 600 (lOth ed. 1975).
70. See Ely, supra note 63, at 920 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2 and lJoe, 410
U.S. at 181-82).
71. A number of statutes which were designed to provide some measure of protec
tion for the fetus have been struck down as unconstitutional: Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (statute subjecting the physician to criminal liability if certain
prescribed standards were not followed when the fetus might be viable); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-79 (1976) (statute prohibiting the use of saline
amniocentesis and requiring the consent of either the parents or the husband); Hodgson
v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (statute defining point of potential viabil
ity at twenty weeks); Word v. Poeiker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1974) (city ordi
nance requiring that clinics be licensed and that they meet certain standards of
cleanliness, training, and recordkeeping); Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530
F.Supp. 1136, 1145-47 (D.R.1. 1982) (statute requiring a twenty-four hour waiting period
and that woman be informed of certain facts about the fetus and abortion). For a discus
sion of the difficulty in designing a criminal abortion statute today, see Note, Viability
and Fetal Life in State Criminal Abortion Laws, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 324
(1981).
72. 439 U.S. at 390.
73. G. GUNTHER, infra note 69, at 616.
74. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
75. Id. at 64.
76. Colaul/i, 439 U.S. at 392-97. Apparently, if the aborting physician knew the
fetus was viable, or was in some way culpable in not knowing, and still aborted it, then
he could be convicted of criminal abortion, provided that the mother's life or health were
not at stake. Id.
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tion which the aborting physician has not chosen to extend. 77 There
fore, because the point of viability is difficult to determine, viable
fetuses may be destroyed78 if the aborting physician makes a judg
mental error. That such little protection for the potentially viable
fetus exists presents a problem for those who believe a life capable of
being preserved should be preserved. Under Roe, even a viable fetus
does not, in its own right, command constitutional protection but
must depend for its right to life on what the state may consider a
compelling interest. Such an interest has not fared well when bal
anced against the fundamental right of the mother. 79
The Roe decision has created another problem by interfering
with the evolution toward more fetal protection in many branches of
law. It is tolerable that the different branches of law may be at dif
ferent evolutionary stages in the development of fetal rights,80 but
each branch must be allowed to evolve at some finite rate, one that
society can tolerate, and one that leads toward a more unified sys
tem. The evolutionary process has been interrupted in a number of
areas as a result of the way in which the Roe decision has been ap
plied. 8l This is particularly true in the area of abortion law; an ex
amination of the cases in that area after Roe exposes the fiction of
the state's ability to protect the potentially viable fetus. 82 Even when
the fetus is found to be viable, the mother's health may sufficiently
outweigh the state's compelling interest in protecting it. 83 It is likely
that a state's compelling interest will seldom balance favorably
77.

See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973); Co/aulli, 439 U.S. at 393

94.
78. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (the use of
saline amniocentesis in the second trimester cannot be prohibited); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687,690 (8th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (1983)
(hospitalization requirements for dilatation and evacuation-the only second trimester
procedure used in Missouri-were held not reasonably related to the mother's health).
In neither saline amniocentesis nor dilatation and evacuation is the life of the fetus pre
served. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
79. Even after viability, the mother's health may outweigh the state's compelling
interest in protecting the viable fetus. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
80.· For example, constitutional law utilizes the fiction of viability that tort law
abandoned more than two decades ago. See supra notes 26 & 61 and accompanying text.
8!. See supra notes 33-37, 44-46, & 70-76 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 71 (examples of protective provisions in a number of statutes
that have been struck down). See also L. WARDLE & M.A.G. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS
AT ABORTION 157-73 (1982) (citing additional cases in which such statutes have been
invalidated).
83. 410 U.S. at 165. It is unclear what the Supreme Court meant by "health," as it
did not specify whether mental as well as physical health was included or to what degree
the mother's health must be threatened.
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against a woman's constitutional right.84 On its face, however, there
is room for both growth and change in the Roe decision, as it dictates
a balancing of a mother's liberty interest against the state's compel
ling interest in protecting potential life at viability. If such a balanc
ing test were in reality adopted, as the states express a greater interest
in protecting the unborn, as they clearly have done,85 the scales
should shift toward giving that interest greater weight.

D. Potential Conflicts
The law in the area of fetal rights has changed since and, in fact,
was changing before the Roe decision. In all areas of law where fetal
rights are protected, there is a potential conflict with a woman's right
to choose to abort. Such conflict has been explicitly recognized in
the following cases.
In Chrisaafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 86 a viable fetus was killed in
an automobile accident. The court allowed a wrongful death ac
tion87 by defining "person" within the statute 88 to include a viable
fetus. 89 Dissenting, Justice Ryan argued that a fetus is not a "person"
within the statute90 and expressed his concern regarding the poten
tial conflict with the Roe decision by asking if the father would have
a cause of action for wrongful death in an abortion case. 9\ The dis
sent expressed the belief that the legislature should correlate wrong
ful death statutes with abortion statutes to avoid such a conflict.92
84. Recently, the Supreme Court decided three abortion cases. Simopoulos v. Vir
ginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). In
both the Akron and Planned Parenthood cases, the Court held, among other things, that
the hospitalization requirement for all second trimester abortions was unconstitutional.
Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493; Planned Parenthood, 103 S. Ct. at 2520. Since during the
second trimester the state's compelling interest is only in the mother's health and not in
the preservation of the potential life of the fetus, Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65, safer modem
procedures make hospitalization unnecessary to protect that interest, at least into the
early part of the second trimester. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495-96. With these decisions, the
states have lost much of their ability to monitor abortions in which fetuses may be viable.
Although such monitoring may not have protected viable fetuses so long as they were
destroyed before there was any opportunity for evaluation, supra note 78 and accompa
nying text, it may have been a deterrent to physicians contemplating the aborting of a
potentially viable fetus.
85. See supra notes 31-32 & 38 and accompanying text.
86. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
87. Id at 374, 304 N.E.2d at 91.
88. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ I, 2 (1981).
89. 55 Ill.2d at 374-75, 304 N.E.2d at 92.
90. Id at 377-79, 304 N.E.2d at 93-94 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 379-81, 304 N.E.2d at 94-95.
92. Id at 381, 304 N.E.2d at 95.
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In Parks v. Harden ,93 the majority held that an unborn was an
"eligible individual" for whom the mother could collect AFDC94
benefits. The dissent noted that, under the majority's holding, a wo
man might collect benefits the first six months of pregnancy and then
abort the fetus before viability.95 The dissent argued that it was in
consistent to extend benefits out of concern for the fetus's wellbeing
and then allow the mother to abort her "eligible individual."96 Al
though the majority decision was overruled in Burns v. Alcala,97 such
an argument reflects the basic philosophical conflicts which may de
velop in light of the Roe decision when there is an attempt to extend
fetal protection.
In Wallace v. Wallace ,98 a case in which a nonviable fetus was
killed in a motor vehicle accident, the court held that "it would be
incongruous for a mother to have a federal constitutional right to
deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus. . . and at the same time for a
third person to be subject to liability to the fetus for his unintended
but merely negligent acts."99 The dissent expressed the belief that a
fetus can be a "person" for one purpose and not for another.loo Such
an analysis would lead to the same result as would application of a
balancing test, 101 and the dissenting judge might have recognized
this alternative approach had he carried his analysis further.
In Curlender v. Rio-Science Laboratories, 102 a wrongful life ac
tion103 was allowed when the parents were not given sufficient facts
to make a conscious choice. I04 The court noted, in dicta, that if the
parents were given such facts and made the wrong choice, then the
child could sue them.105 If one can be held liable for making the
93. 504 F.2d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 601-612 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982).
95. 504 F.2d at 877 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1974).
98. 120 N.H. 675, 421 A.2d 134 (1980).
99. Id. at 679, 421 A.2d at 137. The court failed to recognize that the difficulty is
not removed at the point of viability, as the mother may still have such a right if her life
or health is endangered. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
100. 120 N.H. 684, 421 A.2d at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. In the former case, the mother's constitutionally protected right to abort a
nonviable fetus would outweigh the fetus's right to protection; in the latter case there is
no constitutional interest to counterbalance the same fetal right.
102. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
103. A wrongful life action is one by the child rather than the parents, as in one for
wrongful birth. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
104. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
105. Id. In response to this problem, the California legislature passed a bill
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wrong choice and not aborting, then it logically follows that one may
also be held liable for deciding to abort if that decision is later found
to be the wrong one. The problematic ramifications of such a logical
argument are clear.
In the case of Grodin v. Grodin, 106 the court allowed an action to
be brought against the mother for prenatal injuries suffered due to
her negligence. 107 Although the court did not explicitly recognize a
potential conflict, one may easily be perceived. In Danos v. St.
Pierre,108 the court argued that it made no sense to allow the
tortfeasor to escape punishment because the fetus was dead rather
than injured. 109 If this argument is applied to a situation such as that
in Grodin, then a mother could be held liable for the death of a fetus
caused by her negligence. This is only a small, logical step away
from holding her liable for the intentional killing of her unborn. I 10
These five cases offer only a sampling of the numerous conflicts
which have arisen or may arise as a consequence of Roe. Such con
flicts are the result of extending fetal protection on the one hand III
and withdrawing it on the other.ll2
III.
A.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Congressional Solutions 113

Two types of federal legislation have been initiated and a
number of bills have been introduced in response to Roe. One of
preventing such an action. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (Deering 1983). Murphy, supra note
17, at 364-65 n.31.
106. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1980).
107. Id at 401-02,301 N.W.2d at 871. Intrafamily immunity, with two exceptions,
has been abolished in Michigan. Id at 399,301 N.W.2d at 870.
108. 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981).
109. Id at 638.
110. See generally Comment, Parental Liabilityfor Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 47 (1978). The author of the foregoing comment points out that it would
seem illogical to hold parents liable for negligently injuring their unborn but not for
aborting it. Id at 83.
Ill. See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
1l3. See generally Committee on Federal Legislation, Anti-Abortion Proposals
Before the 97th Congress, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 559 (1982); Destro, Abortion and the
Constitution: The Needfor a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975);
Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Rejlections on Proposed
"Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982); Kolb, The Proposed Human Life
Statute: Abortion as Murder?, 67 A.B.A.J. 1122 (1981); M. ROSENBERG & K.J. LEWIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT A HUMAN LIFE STATUTE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF S. 158 (1981).
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these, the Helms-Hyde bill,114 declares that human life shall exist
from the moment of conception and that "person" includes all
human life. Stephen H. Galebach, the originator of the bill, argues
that, since the Roe Court declined to define when life begins, it is up
to the legislature to do SO.115 He further argued that the Court's
holding that "person" does not include the unborn rests on its inabil
ity to define the beginning of human life. I 16 The effect of such legis
lation would be to give the fetus greater protection by extending to it
a constitutional interest of its own from the moment of conception;
this, in tum, would require a genuine balancing against the constitu
tional interest of the mother from that moment.
Some proponents of the right-to-life movement questioned the
constitutionality of such bills and decided that a constitutional
amendment would be more effective. 117 Two types of amendments
have been drafted: the first prohibits all abortions I 18 and the second
allows abortion only to save the life of the mother. I 19 The effect of
either of these would be to extinguish a woman's constitutionally
protected liberty interest and establish an extremely rigid system. 120
Court decisions and legislation that are rule-oriented are often
rigid 121 and not susceptible to a smoother, albeit slower, evolution
which would allow for society's changing needs. 122 In fact, it may be
the rule-oriented nature of Roe 123 which makes that decision so
inflexible.
114. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a)(b), 127 CONGo REC. 58420 (1981). This bill
is also known as the "Human Life Statute." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114
(10th ed. Supp. 1981).
115. G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 115.
116. ld
117. ld at 48.
118. E.g., S.l. Res. 19, H.R.l. Res. 104, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (partially re
printed in G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48).
119. E.g., S.l. Res. 17, H.R.l. Res. 125, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (partially re
printed in G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48).
120. Although some amendments are written broadly and are subject to judicial
interpretation, one which defines "person" to include "unborn offspring at every stage of
their biological development," G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48 (citing S.l. Res. 17,
H.R.l. Res. 125, § 1), and which requires that "(n)o unborn person shall be deprived of
life by any person . . . (except when) required to prevent the death of the mother," id
(citing § 2), cannot be interpreted to allow survival of the mother's right to an abortion
except when her death is imminent.
121. For a discussion of the rigidity problem in the area of wrongful death actions,
see Note, Wrongful Death and The Stillborn Fetus: A Common Law Solution to a Statu
tory Dilemma, 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 819, 830-34 (1982).
122. For an example of such an evolution in tort law, see supra notes 17-42 and
accompanying text.
123. See supra note 64.
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The States' Solution

Some states have managed to extend protection to the fetus
through their own "solution." By refusing public aid for abortions
to indigent women, these states force women who have insufficient
funds and who are unable to secure aid elsewhere, to bear unwanted
children they cannot afford to raise. 124 Such a denial of aid has been
held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe, 125 Maher v.
Roe,126 and Poelker v. Doe .127 This "solution" is most disturbing in
that it defeats one of the important justifications for the Roe Court's
nationalization of a woman's right to abort-that of extending the
right equally to all, including those who could not afford to travel to
a state in which abortion was legal. Further, this solution does not
provide equal protection for all unborn at any particular point in
their development-it only protects the unborn of the poor. 128
C. A Possible Alternative-The Douglas Case
Neither leaving the situation as it is, with both the real and po
tential problems resulting from the Roe decision, nor adopting legis
lation to move rigidly and abruptly in the other direction provides a
very satisfactory answer. The problems of unwanted pregnancies
pointed out in Roe 129 still plague society. Science is attempting to
help solve such problems; in the future, early transplantation of a
fetus into a barren womb or a test tube may be possible, and better
methods of birth control may be available. Further, society may be
come more tolerant of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and a woman's
surrender of her child for adoption, but the problems as they exist
today cannot be ignored. At present, it is absolutely necessary to
allow women, rich and poor, to exercise their constitutional right to
abortion before viability. On the other hand, it is also necessary to
provide greater protection to the potentially viable fetus. None of
the solutions offered by lawmakers accomplishes these goals; 130
Judge Clarie's holding in the Douglas case may do so.
The facts of Douglas are as follows: On July 8, 1981, Rosalie
124. See Jones, Abortion and the Consideration of Fundamental, Irreconcilable In
terests, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 565, 571 (1982).
125. 432 U.S. 438, 447-48 n. 15 (1977).
126. 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977).
127. 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977).
128. See Jones, supra note 124, at 571 n.38 (citing Cates, The Hyde Amendment in
Action, 246 J. A.M.A. 1\09-11 (1981».
129. 4\0 U.S. at 153.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 113-28.
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Douglas, then approximately six months pregnant, was allegedly hit
on the head with a nightstick by a Hartford police officer while she
was attempting to aid her sister. 131 Paul, Ms. Douglas' son, was born
on October 22, 1981, apparently with prenatal injuries caused by the
officer's blow.132 Both the mother and the infant alleged violation of
their constitutional rights because of police brutality and claimed ac
tual and punitive damages under section 1983 against the unnamed
police officers and the town of Hartford. 133 On July 2, 1982, the de
fendants moved to dismiss the charges on several grounds. 134 The
court, however, disagreed with the defendants' argument that the fe
tus is neither a "citizen" nor a "person" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. 135 Instead, the court denied the motion and
held that a viable fetus is a "person" and thus has standing to sue
under section 1983.136 Judge elarie's opinion restated the plaintiffs'
arguments, emphasizing the expansion of fetal rights in a wide vari
ety of legal contexts,137 but made no mention of the Roe decision, in
spite of the fact that the defendant's main argument was based on
Roe .138
This case cannot be distinguished from Roe based solely on the
fact that the action was brought under section 1983. Section 1983
was a codi.fication of a portion of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 139 The Act is reme
dial onlyl40 and may be invoked either when constitutional rights
131. Memorandum of Law as to Claims of Paul Douglas at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 542 F. Supp. at 1268.
135. Id. at 1269-70.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1270. The plaintiffs had cited a number of cases supporting the propo
sition that the recent trend in the state courts is toward expansion of fetal rights. Memo
randum of Law as to Claims of Paul Douglas at 2-3 (citing Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380
A.2d 1353 (1977); and Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88
(1973».
138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant at 2.
139. 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2609-10. A right of action was created
in federal court against state and territorial officials who refused to enforce states laws
against those who violated the rights of freed slaves and union sympathizers. Supreme
Court decisions have extended § 1983 protection so that governments and their officers
may be liable if they violate the civil rights of persons within their jurisdiction. Id.
140. A statute which is remedial only gives a means of obtaining redress and does
not furnish the right. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162-63 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). E.g.,
Maher v. Gagne,'448 U.S. 122, 129 n.ll (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Davis v. Foreman, 251 F.2d 421, 422 (7th Cir. 1958);
Hernandez V. Pierce, 512 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Harley v.Schuylkill, 476
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have been violated 141 or when there has been some deprivation of
rights under federal law. 142
Under section 1983, only the person injured has standing to
143
sue.
The definition of "person" for purposes of section 1983 must
be found within the substantive law being enforced. 144 Therefore, in
cases such as Doug/as, in which deprivation of constitutional rights is
alleged, the meaning of "person" must be found within the Constitu
tion, or, more precisely, within the fourteenth amendment. 14S Courts
employing this approach have held, based on Roe, that a fetus is not
a "person." 146 Further, one court noted that since Roe, no case has
held that a fetus is a "person" within the Constitution. 147 Although
there are very few section 1983 cases involving fetal rights, courts, in
other contexts, have consistently sought the meaning of "person" for
purposes of section 1983 within the Constitution. 148
In light of the remedial nature of section 1983 and the explicit
holding in Roe that" 'person' ... does not include the unbom,"149
it is difficult to see how Judge Clarie could arrive at his holding in
F. Supp. 191, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508,
515 (N.D. Ala. 1977), aJTd in part, rev'd in part, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 917 (1980) (argument that "a statute can be no broader than its [c]onstitutional
base"-referring to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act rather than to § 1983).
141. E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979); Firnhaber v. Sensen
brenner, 385 F. Supp. 406, 409 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
142. E.g., Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966); Gage v. Common
wealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80, 87 (N.D. lli. 1972).
143. Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1,8-9,550 P.2d 339,345, cert. granted, 429 U.S.
1061, dismissed, 432 U.S. 183 (1976). There have been arguments made that, where par
ents allege a financialloss, this traditional rule should be relaxed, e.g., Clark v. Lutcher,
436 F. Supp. 1266,1269 (M.D. Pa. 1977); but in Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), the
Court held that the unborn do not have a right to sue for AFDC (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children) benefits under § 1983. Id at 577.
144. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 799-800 (W.D. Va. 1981); McGarvey v.
McGee Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 753 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aJTd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d
Cir. 1973).
145. See mpra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
146. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981); McGarvey v.
McGee Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aJTd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d
Cir. 1973).
147. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981). Harman was
relied on heavily by the defense in Douglas, as it was both factually and legally on point.
The Harman court found that a fetus did not have an action under § 1983 because § 1983
protection extended no further than that given by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 799
800.
148. E.g., Adams v. Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961); Trapper Brown
Construction v. Electromech, 358 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (D.N.H. 1973); Tobin v. Rizzo,
305 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
149. 410 U.S. at 158.
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Douglas without intentionally flouting the Supreme Court. The
judge may have reached such a holding based on several lines of
reasoning. It is hard to believe he thought that the two actions could
be distinguished based on the difference between a section 1983 case
and one under the fourteenth amendment. It is more likely he. rec
ognized that justice requires there be a remedy for such an injury,
and that, since, in this case, there was no constitutional interest to
counterbalance the interest of the plaintiff as there was in Roe, the
remedy should be applied.
On the other hand, Judge Clarie's analysis may have been far
more complex. On examination of his dissent inAbele v. Markle,lso
it is clear he believed that Connecticut had a strong interest in pre
serving the life of the unborn and that action such as was taken in
Roe should be left to the legislature. l5l Now almost ten years after
Roe, the judge may believe that 1) the Roe Court's argument that
fetal rights are not well-recognized lS2 may be less valid today and
2) the holding that the fetus is not a "person" within the fourteenth
amendment has created a dichotomy in the legal rights of the fetus
which is leading to intolerable conflicts in our laws. Support for
such a conclusion is found in the previous analysis of fetal rights
evolution and of the conflicts resulting from the Roe decision. ls3
Judge Clarie held that a viable fetus is a "person."IS4 Such a
definition would extend the same protection after viability as would
be provided from the point of conception by adoption of the
"Human Life Statute."lss It would allow a balancing similar to that
promised by the Roe Court, but, in fact, seldom done in a manner
favorable to the potentially viable fetus. ls6 Such a step, requiring one
constitutional interest to be weighed against another,ls7 would possi
150. 351 F. Supp. at 224, 233-36 (D. Conn. 1972) (Clarie, J., dissenting). While
Roe was pending the court, inAhe/e, struck down Connecticut's abortion statute in much
the same manner that the Roe Court struck down Texas' statute. 351 F.Supp. 224, 232
(D. Conn. 1972).
151. 351 F. Supp. 224, 235 (D. Conn. 1972) (Clarie, J., dissenting).
152. 410 U.S. at 161-62.
153. See supra notes 26,31,32,38, 86-112 and accompanying text.
154. Doug/as, 542 F. Supp. at 1269.
155. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 71.
157. The Roe Court argued that, if the fetus were a "person," then the mother
would have no right to abort, 410 U.S. at 156-57; but this reasoning is fallacious in that, if
two constitutional rights are in conflict, they must be balanced. Ely, supra note 63, at 926
n.48. q: Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (a case in which the
first amendment rights of the press were balanced against the sixth amendment right to a
fair trial).
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bly allow consideration at the point of viability of such factors as the
father's wishes, the burden on the mother, and the availability of a
home for the child. Further, with a weightier interest potentially in
the balance, and as the point at which that interest may become op
erative, safeguards to protect that interest from being ignored would
likely be allowed. ISS If states were allowed to establish a period of
potential viability, based on the fetus's age, in which such a balanc
ing would be required, the burden placed upon the physician would
be lessened. 159 Such a period could be extended back to the earliest
point at which the fetus could survive outside the womb to provide
some protection to all viable fetuses. l60
If appealed, it seems likely that Judge Clarie's holding will be
reversed, as it is difficult not to conclude that his decision conflicts
with that of the Supreme Court. 161 This may be unfortunate because
such a holding might provide the preferred small evolutionary step.
There are several arguments, however, that might allow this decision
to stand. First, the premise that" 'person' . . . does not include the
unborn" 162 was unnecessary for the Court's decision in Roe .163 Sec
ond, the Court's definition of "person" is only relevant in a context
where the beginning of life is unknown but is not relevant to the
point at which life is known to exist. l64 Finally, since the Roe case
involved a Texas statute and Texas, according to the Court,165 had
shown little interest in protecting the fetus, in that situation " 'person'
. . . does not include the unborn"; 166 on the other hand, since Con
necticut has always expressed great interest in the preservation of
life, it may appropriately define a viable fetus as a "person" within
158. Under the Roe decision, during the second trimester, the state's only compel
ling interest is in that of the mother's health. 410 U.S. at 164-65. For that reason, tech
niques which may destroy the fetus are allowed if they are the safest for the mother.
Co/aul/i, 439 U.S. at 397-98 (saline amniocentesis); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash
croft, 664 F.2d 687, 689 (8th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983) (dilatation and
evacuation).
159. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
160. Such a suggestion is similar to that made by King, supra note 17, that the law
"should err on the safe side ... to give all [fetuses) that may be viable a chance." Id. at
1680 n.I46.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-49.
162. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
163. See supra note 157. If the Roe Court erred and a balancing test would be
done whether or not the fetus was a "person," then the holding that the fetus is not a
"person" was unnecessary to reach the Court's decision.
164. This argument is similar to that of Galebach, G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at
115.
165. Roe, 410 U.S. at ISO-52.
166. Id. at 158.
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the fourteenth amendment. 167
A simple answer to the mystery of Judge Clarie's decision
would be to attribute it to his own resistance to liberalized abor
tions,168 but there may be more behind it. 169 The fact that he did not
refer to Roe is, admittedly, disturbing; but it may have been strategi
cally wise if, in fact, this small evolutionary step is to be allowed to
stand. Whether the judge's "solution" is a conscious one is a ques
tion only the judge can answer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The conflict that exists between the protection of a woman's
constitutional right to privacy and the rights of the unborn cannot be
completely resolved today. 170 The "solutions" offered by federal and
state lawmakers are unacceptable and would create more problems
than they would solve. l7l Rather than extending protection to the
unborn at the point of conception, as these "solutions" would do, 172
the Douglas definition of "person" extends protection only to a via
ble fetus and allows the mother's right to abortion to remain intact,
at least to the point at which the fetus may be viable. 173 At that
point, since there potentially is a second constitutional interest, that
of the fetus, a true balancing of that interest against the mother's
would be necessary.174
Admittedly many of the potential conflicts in areas of law in
which fetal rights' evolution has been "aborted" would remain un
resolved, even if Judge Clarie's definition of "person" is accepted.
Such a definition; however, would at least allow extension of fetal
rights to the point of potential viability.175
The Douglas holding provides, at most, one small step down the
evolutionary path. The future will require more steps, but, hope
fully, not until the time when both the constitutional rights of the
mother and that of the fetus may be protected equally and simulta
neously. Science and society must work together to provide the final
167. See Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 233-36 (Clarie, J., dissenting). See also 542 F.
Supp. at 1270.
168. Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 233-36 (Clarie, J., dissenting).
169. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
174. Id.
175. Some courts since Roe have refused to extend protection to the fetus at any
stage. See supra notes 34 & 48 and accompanying text.

1983]

ABORTION LAW

553

solution. 176 For now, one small step may prove sufficient to quiet
the anger of those concerned that viable fetuses may be killed in
utero 177 or removed in sections 178 and yet would allow a mother's
constitutional right to privacy to remain intact until the point of po
tential viability and to be balanced equally against the fetus's right to
life as a "person" after that point.
Nancy Jo Linck

176. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
177. The result of the abortion procedure using saline amniocentesis. Colaulli,439
U.S. at 397-98.
178. The result of dilatation and evacuation. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash
croft, 655 F.2d 848, 865 (8th Cir. 1981), (citing TIETZE, INDUCED ABORTION: 1979,68
(3d ed. 1979», affd, \03 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).

